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Abstract
We introduce a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a
wide breadth of multi-agent learning algorithms, and analyze the limiting behavior of competitive
gradient-based learning algorithms using dynamical systems theory. For both general-sum and
potential games, we characterize a non-negligible subset of the local Nash equilibria that will be
avoided if each agent employs a gradient-based learning algorithm. We also shed light on the
issue of convergence to non-Nash strategies in general- and zero-sum games, which may have no
relevance to the underlying game, and arise solely due to the choice of algorithm. The existence and
frequency of such strategies may explain some of the difficulties encountered when using gradient
descent in zero-sum games as, e.g., in the training of generative adversarial networks. To reinforce
the theoretical contributions, we provide empirical results that highlight the frequency of linear
quadratic dynamic games (a benchmark for multi-agent reinforcement learning) that admit global
Nash equilibria that are almost surely avoided by policy gradient.
Keywords: continuous games, gradient-based algorithms, multi-agent learning
1. Introduction
With machine learning algorithms increasingly being deployed in real world settings, it is crucial
that we understand how the algorithms can interact, and the dynamics that can arise from their
interactions. In recent years, there has been a resurgence in research efforts on multi-agent learning,
and learning in games. The recent interest in adversarial learning techniques also serves to show
how game theoretic tools can be being used to robustify and improve the performance of machine
learning algorithms. Despite this activity, however, machine learning algorithms are still being
treated as black-box approaches and being naı¨vely deployed in settings where other algorithms are
actively changing the environment. In general, outside of highly structured settings, there exists no
guarantees on the performance or limiting behaviors of learning algorithms in such settings.
∗. This work was published in the SIAM Journal on Mathematics for Data Science on February 18, 2020
(https://doi.org/10.1137/18M1231298). This work was funded by the National Science Foundation Award
CNS:1656873 and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Award FA8750-18-C-0101
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Indeed, previous work on understanding the collective behavior of coupled learning algorithms,
either in competitive or cooperative settings, has mainly looked at games where the global structure
is well understood like bilinear gamesSingh et al. (2000); Hommes and Ochea (2012); Mertikopou-
los et al. (2018); Leslie and Collins (2005), convex games Mertikopoulos and Zhou (2019); Rosen
(1965), or potential games Monderer and Shapley (1996), among many others. Such games are more
conducive to the statement of global convergence guarantees since the assumed global structure can
be exploited.
In games with fewer assumptions on the players’ costs, however, there is still a lack of under-
standing of the dynamics and limiting behaviors of learning algorithms. Such settings are becoming
increasingly prevalent as deep learning is increasingly being used in game theoretic settings Good-
fellow et al. (2014); Foerster et al. (2018); Abdallah and Lesser (2008); Zhang and Lesser (2010).
Gradient-based learning algorithms are extremely popular in a variety of these multi-agent set-
tings due to their versatility, ease of implementation, and dependence on local information. There
are numerous recent papers in multi-agent reinforcement learning that employ gradient-based meth-
ods (see, e.g.Abdallah and Lesser (2008); Foerster et al. (2018); Zhang and Lesser (2010)), yet even
within this well-studied class of learning algorithms, a thorough understanding of their convergence
and limiting behaviors in general continuous games is still lacking.
Generally speaking, in both the game theory and the machine learning communities, two of the
central questions when analyzing the dynamics of learning in games are the following:
Q1. Are all attractors of the learning algorithms employed by agents equilibria relevant to the
underlying game?
Q2. Are all equilibria relevant to the game also attractors of the learning algorithms agents em-
ploy?
In this paper, we provide some answers to the above questions for the class of gradient-based learn-
ing algorithms by analyzing their limiting behavior in general continuous games. In particular, we
leverage the continuous time limit of the more naturally discrete multi-agent learning algorithms.
This allows us to draw on the extensive theory of dynamical systems and stochastic approxima-
tion to make statements about the limiting behaviors of these algorithms in both deterministic and
stochastic settings. The latter is particularly relevant since it is common for stochastic gradient
methods to be used in multi-agent machine learning contexts.
Analyzing gradient-based algorithms through the lens of dynamical systems theory has recently
yielded new insights into their behavior in the classical optimization setting Wilson et al. (2016);
Scieur et al.; Lee et al. (2016). We show that a similar type of analysis can also help understand the
limiting behaviors of gradient-based algorithms in games. We remark, however, that there is a fun-
damental difference between the dynamics that are analyzed in much of the single-agent, gradient-
based learning and optimization literature and the ones we analyze in the competitive multi-agent
case: the combined dynamics of gradient-based learning schemes in games do not necessarily corre-
spond to a gradient flow. This may seem a subtle point, but it it turns out to be extremely important.
Gradient flows admit desirable convergence guarantees—e.g., almost sure convergence to local
minimizers—due to the fact that they preclude flows with the worst geometries Pemantle (2007). In
particular, they do not exhibit non-equilibrium limiting behavior such as periodic orbits. Gradient-
based learning in games, on the other hand, does not preclude such behavior. Moreover, as we
show, asymmetry in the dynamics of gradient-play in games can lead to surprising behaviors such
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as non-relevant limiting behaviors being attracting under the flow of the game dynamics and relevant
limiting behaviors, such as a subset of the Nash equilibria being almost surely avoided.
1.1 Related Work
The study of continuous games is quite extensive (see e.g. Basar and Olsder (1998); Osborne
(1994)), though in large part the focus has been on games admitting a fair amount of structure.
The behavior of learning algorithms in games is also well-studied (see e.g. Fudenberg and Levine
(1998)). In this section, we comment on the most relevant prior work and defer a more comprehen-
sive discussion of our results in the context of prior work to Section 6.
As we noted, previous work on learning in games in both the game theory literature, and more
recently from the machine learning community, has largely focused on addressing (Q1) whether
all attractors of the learning dynamics are game-relevant equilibria, and (Q2) whether all game-
relevant equilibria are also attractors of the learning dynamics. The primary type of game-relevant
equilibrium considered in the investigation of these two questions is a Nash equilibrium.
The majority of the existing work has focused on Q1. In fact, a large body of prior work focuses
on games with structures that preclude the existence of non-Nash equilibria. Consequently, answer-
ing Q1 reduces to analyzing the convergence of various learning algorithms (including gradient-
play) to the unique Nash equilibrium or the set of Nash equilibria. This is often shown by exploiting
the game structure. Examples of classes of games where gradient-play has been well-studied are po-
tential games Monderer and Shapley (1996), concave or monotone games Rosen (1965); Bravo et al.
(2018); Mertikopoulos and Zhou (2019), and gradient-play over the space of stochastic policies in
two-player finite-action bilinear games Singh et al. (2000). In the latter setting, other gradient-like
algorithms such as multiplicative weights have also been studied fairly extensively Hommes and
Ochea (2012), and have been shown to converge to cycling behaviors.
Some works have also attempted to address Q1 in the context of gradient-play in two-player
zero-sum games. Concurrently with this paper, for a general class of “sufficiently smooth” two-
player, zero-sum games it was shown that there exists stationary points for gradient-play that are
non-Nash Daskalakis and Panageas (2018)1. In such games, it has also been shown that gradient-
play can converge to cycles (see, e.g., Mertikopoulos et al. (2018); Wesson and Rand (2016);
Hommes and Ochea (2012)).
There is also related work in more general games on the analysis of when Nash equilibria are
attracting for gradient-based approaches (i.e. Q2). Sufficient conditions for this to occur are the
conditions for stable differential Nash equilibria introduced in Ratliff et al. (2013, 2014, 2016) and
the condition for variational stability later analyzed in Mertikopoulos and Zhou (2019). We remark
that these conditions are equivalent for the classes of games we consider. Neither of these works
give conditions under which Nash equilibria are avoided by gradient-play or comment on other
attracting behaviors.
Expanding on this rich body of literature (only the most relevant of which is covered in our short
review), in this paper we provide answers to Q1 without imposing structure on the game outside
regularity conditions on the cost functions by exploiting the observation that gradient-based learning
dynamics are not gradient flows. We also provide answers to Q2 by demonstrating that a non-trivial
set of games admit Nash equilibria that are almost surely avoided by gradient-play. We give explicit
1. This paper was under review at the time that Daskalakis and Panageas (2018) became publicly available. Our results
show the existence of these non-Nash equilibria and attracting cycles in both general-sum and zero-sum games.
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conditions for when this occurs. Using similar analysis tools, we also provide new insights into the
behavior of gradient-based learning in structured classes of games such as zero-sum and potential
games.
1.2 Contributions and Organization
We present a general framework for modeling competitive gradient-based learning that applies to
a broad swath of learning algorithms. In Section 3, we draw connections between the limiting be-
havior of this class of algorithms and game-theoretic and dynamical systems notions of equilibria.
In particular, we construct general-sum and zeros-sum games that admit non-Nash attracting equi-
libria of the gradient dynamics. Such points are attracting under the learning dynamics, yet at least
one player—and potentially all of them—has a direction in which they could unilaterally deviate to
decrease their cost. Thus, these non-Nash equilibria are of questionable game theoretic relevance
and can be seen as artifacts of the players’ algorithms.
In Section 4, we show that policy gradient multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), gen-
erative adversarial networks (GANs), gradient-based multi-agent multi-armed bandits, among sev-
eral other common multi-agent learning settings, conform to this framework. The framework is
amenable to tools for analysis from dynamical systems theory.
Also in Section 4, we show that a subset of the local Nash equilibria in general-sum games and
potential games is avoided almost surely when each player employs a gradient-based algorithm. We
show that this holds in two broad settings: the full information setting when each player has oracle
access to their gradient but randomly initializes their first action, and a partial information setting
where each player has access to an unbiased estimate of their gradient.
Thus, we provide a negative answer to both Q1 and Q2 for n–player general-sum games, and
highlight the nuances present in zero-sum and potential games. We also show that the dynamics
formed from the individual gradients of agents’ costs are not gradient flows. This in turn implies
that competitive gradient-based learning in general-sum games may converge to periodic orbits and
other non-trivial limiting behaviors that arise in, e.g., chaotic systems.
To support the theoretical results, we present empirical results in Section 5 that show that policy
gradient algorithms avoid global Nash equilibria in a large number of linear quadratic (LQ) dynamic
games, a benchmark for MARL.
We conclude in Section 6 with a discussion of the implications of our results and some links
with prior work as well as some comments on future directions.
2. Preliminaries
Consider n agents indexed by I = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent i ∈ I has their own decision variable
xi ∈ Xi, where Xi is their finite-dimensional strategy space of dimension mi. Define X = X1 ×
· · · × Xn to be the finite-dimensional joint strategy space with dimension m =
∑
i∈Imi. Each
agent is endowed with a cost function fi ∈ Cs(X,R) with s ≥ 2 and such that fi : (xi, x−i) 7→
fi(xi, x−i) where we use the notation x = (xi, x−i) to make the dependence on the action of
the agent xi, and the actions of all agents excluding agent i, x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)
explicit. The agents seek to minimize their own cost, but only have control over their own decision
variable xi. In this setup, agents’ costs are not necessarily aligned with one another, meaning they
are competing.
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Given the game G = (f1, . . . , fn), agents are assumed to update their strategies simultaneously
according to a gradient-based learning algorithm of the form
xi,t+1 = xi,t − γi,thi(xi,t, x−i,t), (1)
where γi,t is agent i’s step-size at iteration t.
We analyze the following two settings:
1. Agents have oracle access to the gradient of their cost with respect to their own choice
variable—i.e. hi(xi,t, x−i,t) = Difi(xi,t, x−i,t) where Difi ≡ ∂fi/∂xi denotes the deriva-
tive of fi with respect to xi.
2. Agents have an unbiased estimator of their gradient—i.e., hi(xi,t, x−i,t) = Difi(xi,t, x−i,t)+
wi,t+1 where {wi,t} is a zero mean, finite variance stochastic process.
We refer to the former setting as deterministic gradient-based learning and the latter setting as
stochastic gradient-based learning. Assuming that all agents are employing such algorithms, we
aim to analyze the limiting behavior of the agents’ strategies. To do so, we leverage the following
game-theoretic notion of a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1 A strategy x ∈ X is a local Nash equilibrium for the game (f1, . . . , fn) if, for each
i ∈ I, there exists an open set Wi ⊂ Xi such that that xi ∈ Wi and fi(xi, x−i) ≤ fi(x′i, x−i) for
all x′i ∈Wi. If the above inequalities are strict, then we say x is a strict local Nash equilibrium.
The focus on local Nash equilibria is due to our lack of assumptions on the agents’ cost func-
tions. If Wi = Xi for each i, then a local Nash equilibrium x is a global Nash equilibrium. This
holds in e.g the bimatrix games and the linear quadratic games we analyze in Section 5. Depending
on the agents’ costs, a game (f1, . . . , fn) may admit anywhere from one to a continuum of local or
global Nash equilibria; or none at all.
3. Linking Games and Dynamical Systems
In this section, we draw links between the limiting behavior of dynamical systems and game-
theoretic notions of equilibria in three broad classes of continuous games. For brevity, the proofs of
the propositions in this section are supplied in Appendix A. A high-level summary of the links we
draw is shown in Figure 1.
Define ω(x) = (D1f1(x), . . . , Dnfn(x)) to be the vector of player derivatives of their own cost
functions with respect to their own choice variables. When each player is employing a gradient-
based learning algorithm, the joint strategy of the players, (in the limit as the agents’ step-sizes go
to zero) follows the differential equation
x˙ = −ω(x).
A point x ∈ X is said to be an equilibrium, critical point, or stationary point of the dynamics if
ω(x) = 0. Stationary points of x˙ = −ω(x) are joint strategies from which, under gradient-play, the
agents do not move. We note that ω(x) = 0 is a necessary condition for a point x ∈ X to be a local
Nash equilibrium Ratliff et al. (2016). Hence, all local Nash equilibria are critical points of the joint
dynamics x˙ = −ω(x).
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Central to dynamical systems theory is the study of limiting behavior and its stability properties.
A classical result in dynamical systems theory allows us to characterize the stability properties of
an equilibrium x∗ by analyzing the Jacobian of the dynamics at x∗. The Jacobian of ω is defined by
Dω(x) =
 D
2
1f1(x) · · · Dn1f1(x)
...
. . .
...
D1nfn(x) · · · D2nfn(x)
 .
Since Dω is a matrix of second derivatives, it is sometimes referred to as the ‘game Hessian’.
Similar to the Hessian matrix of a gradient flow, Dω allows us to further characterize the critical
points of ω by their properties under the flow of x˙ = −ω(x). Let λi(x) ∈ spec(Dω(x)) for
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} denote the eigenvalues of Dω at x where Re(λ1(x)) ≤ · · · ≤ Re(λm(x))—that is,
λ1(x) is the eigenvalue with the smallest real part. Of particular interest are asymptotically stable
equilibria.
Definition 2 A point x ∈ X is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium of the continuous time
dynamics x˙ = −ω(x) if ω(x) = 0 and Re(λ) > 0 for all λ ∈ spec(Dω(x)).
Locally asymptotically stable equilibria have two properties of interest. First, they are isolated,
meaning that there exists a neighborhood around them in which no other equilibria exist. Second,
they are exponentially attracting under the flow of x˙ = −ω(x), meaning that if agents initialize in a
neighborhood of a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium x∗ and follow the dynamics described
by x˙ = −ω(x), they will converge to x∗ exponentially fast Sastry (1999). This, in turn, implies that
a discretized version of x˙ = −ω(x), namely
xt+1 = xt − γω(xt), (2)
converges locally for appropriately selected step size γ at a rate of O(1/t). Such results motivate
the study of the continuous time dynamical system x˙ = −ω(x) in order to understand convergence
properties of gradient-based learning algorithms of the form (1).
Another important class of critical points of a dynamical system are saddle points.
Definition 3 A point x ∈ X is a saddle point of the dynamics x˙ = −ω(x) if ω(x) = 0 and
λ1(x) ∈ spec(Dω(x)) is such that Re(λ1(x)) ≤ 0. A saddle point such that Re(λi) < 0 for
i ∈ {1, . . . , `} and Re(λj) > 0 for j ∈ {` + 1, . . . ,m} with 0 < ` < m is a strict saddle point of
the continuous time dynamics x˙ = −ω(x).
Strict saddle points are especially relevant to our analysis since their neighborhoods are char-
acterized by stable and unstable manifolds Sastry (1999). When the agents evolve according to
the dynamics solely on the stable manifold, they converge exponentially fast to the critical point.
However, when they evolve solely on the unstable manifold, they diverge from the equilibrium ex-
ponentially fast. Agents whose strategies lie on the union of the two manifolds asymptotically avoid
the equilibrium. We make use of this general fact in Section 4.1.
To better understand the links between the critical points of the gradient dynamics and the
Nash equilibria of the game, we make use of an equivalent characterization of strict local Nash
that leverages first and second order conditions on player cost functions. This makes them simpler
objects to link to the various dynamical systems notions of equilibria than local Nash equilibria.
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Definition 4 (Ratliff et al. (2013, 2016)) A point x ∈ X is a differential Nash equilibrium for the
game defined by (f1, . . . , fn) if ω(x) = 0 and D2i fi(x)  0 for each i ∈ I.
In Ratliff et al. (2014), it was shown that local Nash equilibria are generically differential Nash
equilibria where det(Dω(x)) 6= 0 (i.e., Dω is non-degenerate). Thus, in the space of games where
the agents’ costs are at least twice differentiable, the set of games that admit local Nash equilibria
that are not non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria is of measure zero Ratliff et al. (2014). In
Ratliff et al. (2014) it was also shown that non-degenerate Nash equilibria are structurally stable,
meaning that small perturbations to the agents’ costs functions will not change the fundamental
nature of the equilibrium. This also implies that gradient-play with slightly biased estimators of the
gradient will not have vastly different behaviors in neighborhoods of equilibria.
Given these different equilibrium notions of the learning dynamics and the underlying game,
let us define the following sets which will be useful in stating the results in the following sections.
For a game G = (f1, . . . , fn), denote the sets of strict saddle points and locally asymptotically sta-
ble equilibria of the gradient dynamics, x˙ = −ω(x), as SSP(ω) and LASE(ω), respectively, where
we recall that ω(x) = (D1f1(x), . . . , Dnfn(x)). Similarly, denote the set of local Nash equilib-
ria, differential Nash equilibria, and non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria of G as LNE(G),
DNE(G), and NDDNE(G), respectively. As previously mentioned, NDDNE(G) = LNE(G) in almost all
continuous games. The key takeaways of this section are summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Links between the equilibria of generic continuous games G and their properties under the
gradient dynamics x˙ = −ω(x).
3.1 General-sum games
We first analyze the properties of local Nash equilibria under the joint gradient dynamics in n-player
general-sum games.
Proposition 5 A non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium is either a locally asymptotically
stable equilibrium or a strict saddle point of x˙ = −ω(x)—i.e., NDDNE(G) ⊂ SSP(ω) ∪ LASE(ω).
Locally asymptotically stable differential Nash equilibria satisfy the notion of variational stability
introduced in Mertikopoulos and Zhou (2019). In fact, a simple analysis shows that the definitions
of variationally stable equilibria and locally asymptotically stable differential Nash equilibria Ratliff
et al. (2013) are equivalent in the games we consider—i.e., games where each players’ cost is at least
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twice continuously differentiable. We remark that, from the definition of asymptotic stability, the
gradient dynamics have a O(1/t) convergence rate in the neighborhood of such equilibria.
An important point to make is that not every locally asymptotically stable equilibrium of x˙ =
−ω(x) is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium. Indeed, the following proposition pro-
vides an entire class of games whose corresponding gradient dynamics admit locally asymptotically
stable equilibria that are not local Nash equilibria.
Proposition 6 In the class of general-sum continuous games, there exists a continuum of games
containing games G such that LASE(ω) 6⊂ NDDNE(G), and moreover, LASE(ω) 6⊂ LNE(G).
Proof Consider a two player game G = (f1, f2) on R2 where
f1(x1, x2) =
a
2
x21 + bx1x2, and f2(x1, x2) =
d
2
x22 + cx1x2
for constants a, b, c, d ∈ R. The Jacobian of ω is given by
Dω(x1, x2) =
[
a b
c d
]
, ∀(x1, x2) ∈ R2. (3)
If a > 0 and d < 0, then the unique stationary point x = (0, 0) is neither a differential Nash nor a
local Nash equilibria since the necessary conditions are violated (i.e., d < 0). However, if a > −d
and ad > cb, the eigenvalues of Dω have positive real parts and (0, 0) is asymptotically stable.
Further, this clearly holds for a continuum of games. Thus, the set of locally asymptotically stable
equilibria that are not Nash equilibria may be arbitrarily large.
The, preceding proposition shows that there exists attracting critical points of the gradient dy-
namics in general-sum continuous games that are not Nash equilibria and may not be even rele-
vant to the game. Thus, this provides a negative answer to Q2 (whether all attracting equilibria in
general-games are game-relevant for the learning dynamics).
Remark 7 We note that, by definition, the non-Nash locally asymptotically stable equilibria (or
non-Nash equilibria) do not satisfy the second-order conditions for Nash equilibria. Thus, at these
joint strategies, at least one player – and maybe all of them – has a direction in which they would
unilaterally deviate if they were not using gradient descent. As such, we view convergence to these
points to be undesirable.
3.2 Zero-sum games
Let us now restrict our attention to two-player zero-sum games, which often arise when training
GANs, in adversarial learning, and in MARL Goodfellow et al. (2014); Omidshafiei et al. (2017);
Chivukula and Liu (2017). In such games, one player can be seen as minimizing f with respect
to their decision variable and the other as minimizing −f with respect to theirs. The following
proposition shows that all differential Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games are locally
asymptotically stable equilibria under the flow of x˙ = −ω(x).
Proposition 8 For an arbitrary two-player zero-sum game, (f,−f) on Rm, if x is a differential
Nash equilibrium, then x is both a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium and a locally
asymptotically stable equilibrium of x˙ = −ω(x)—that is, DNE(G) ≡ NDDNE(G) ⊂ LASE(ω).
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This result guarantees that the differential Nash equilibria of zero-sum games are isolated and
exponentially attracting under the flow of x˙ = −ω(x). This in turn guarantees that simultaneous
gradient-play has a local linear rate of convergence to all local Nash equilibria in all zero-sum
continuous games. Thus, the answer to Q1 is the context of zero-sum games is “yes”, since all Nash
equilibria are attracting for the gradient dynamics.
The converse of the preceding proposition, however, is not true. Not every locally asymptoti-
cally stable equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games are non-degenerate differential Nash equi-
libria. Indeed, there may be many locally asymptotically stable equilibria in a zero-sum game that
are not local Nash equilibria. The following proposition highlights this fact.
Proposition 9 In the class of zero-sum continuous games, there exists a continuum of games such
that for each game G, LASE(ω) 6⊂ DNE(G) ⊂ LNE(G).
Proof Consider the two-player zero-sum game (f,−f) on R2 where
f(x1, x2) =
a
2
x21 + bx1x2 +
c
2
x22;
and a, b, c ∈ R. The Jacobian of ω is given by
Dω(x1, x2) =
[
a b
−b −c
]
, ∀ (x1, x2) ∈ R2.
If a > c > 0 and b2 > ac, then Dω(x1, x2) has eigenvalues with strictly positive real part, but the
unique stationary point is not a differential Nash equilibrium—since −c < 0—and, in fact, is not
even a Nash equilibrium. Indeed,
−f(0, 0) > −f(0, x2) = − c
2
x22, ∀ x2 6= 0.
Thus, there exists a continuum of zero-sum games with a large set of locally asymptotically stable
equilibria of the corresponding dynamics x˙ = −ω(x) that are not differential Nash.
The, preceding proposition again shows that there exists non-Nash equilibria of the gradient
dynamics in zero-sum continuous games. Thus, this proposition also provides a negative answer to
Q2 in the context of zero-sum games.
3.3 Potential Games
One last set of games with interesting connections between the Nash equilibria and the critical
points of the gradient dynamics is the class known as potential games. This particularly nice class
of games are ones for which ω corresponds to a gradient flow under a coordinate transformation—
that is, there exists a function φ (commonly referred to as the potential function) such that for each
i ∈ I,Difi ≡ Diφ. We remark that due to the equivalence this class of games is sometimes referred
to as an exact potential game. Note that a necessary and sufficient condition for (f1, . . . , fn) to be a
potential game is thatDω is symmetric Monderer and Shapley (1996)—that is,Dijfj ≡ Djifi. This
gives potential games the desirable property that the only locally asymptotically stable equilibria of
the gradient dynamics are local Nash equilibria.
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Proposition 10 For an arbitrary potential game, G = (f1, . . . , fn) on Rm, if x is a locally asymp-
totically stable equilibrium of x˙ = −ω(x) (i.e., x ∈ LASE(ω)), then x is a non-degenerate differen-
tial Nash equilibrium (i.e., x ∈ NDDNE(G)).
The full proof of Proposition 10 is supplied in Appendix A. The preceding proposition rules out
non-Nash locally asymptotically stable equilibria of the gradient dynamics in potential games, and
implies that every local minimum of a potential game must be a local Nash equilibrium. Thus, in
potential games, unlike in general-sum and zero-sum games, the answer to Q2 is positive. However,
the following proposition shows that the existence of a potential function is not enough to rule out
local Nash equilibria that are saddle points of the dynamics.
Proposition 11 In the class of continuous games, there exist a continuum of potential games con-
taining games G that admit Nash equilibria that are saddle points of the dynamics x˙ = −ω(x)—i.e.,
∃ G such that for some x ∈ LNE(G), x ∈ SSP(ω).
Proof Consider the game (f, f) on X = R2 described by
f(x1, x2) =
a
2
x21 + bx1x2 +
c
2
x22
where a, b, d ∈ R. The Jacobian of ω is given by
Dω(x1, x2) =
[
a b
b c
]
, ∀ (x1, x2) ∈ R2.
If a, c > 0, then x = (0, 0) is a local Nash equilibrium. However, if ac < b2, Dω(x) has one
positive and one negative eigenvalue and (0, 0) is a saddle point of the gradient dynamics. Thus,
there exists a continuum of potential games where a large set of differential Nash equilibria are strict
saddle points of x˙ = −ω(x).
Proposition 11 demonstrates a surprising fact about potential games. Even though all minimizers
of the potential function must be local Nash equilibria, not all local Nash equilibria are minimizers
of the potential function.
3.4 Main Takeaways
The main takeaways of this section are summarized in Figure 1. We note that for zero-sum games,
Proposition 9 shows that LNE(G) ⊂ LASE(ω). Since the inclusion is strict, the answer to Q2 in
such games is “no”. For general-sum games, Proposition 6 allows us to to conclude that there do
exist attracting, non-Nash equilibria. Thus, the answer to Q2 is also “no”. In potential games, since
LASE(ω) ⊂ LNE(G) the answer is “yes”.
In the following sections, we provide answers to Q1 by showing that all local Nash equilibria in
LNE(G) ∩ SSP(ω) are avoided almost surely by gradient-based algorithms in both the deterministic
and stochastic settings. In particular, since LNE(G) ∩ SSP(ω) 6= ∅ in potential and general-sum
games, one cannot give a positive answer to Q1 in either of these classes of games.
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4. Convergence of Gradient-Based Learning
In this section, we provide convergence and non-convergence results for gradient-based algorithms.
We also include a high-level overview of well-known algorithms that fit into the class of learning
algorithms we consider; more detail can be found in Appendix C.
4.1 Deterministic Setting
We first address convergence to equilibria in the deterministic setting in which agents have oracle
access to their gradients at each time step. This includes the case where agents know their own cost
functions fi and observe their own actions as well as their competitors’ actions—and hence, can
compute the gradient of their cost with respect to their own choice variable.
Since we have assumed that each agent i ∈ I has their own learning rate (i.e. step sizes γi), the
joint dynamics of all the players are given by
xt+1 = g(xt) (4)
where g : x 7→ x−γω(x) with γ = (γi)i∈I and γ > 0 element-wise. By a slight abuse of notation,
γ  ω(xt) is defined to be element-wise multiplication of γ and ω(·) where γ1 is multiplied by the
first m1 components of ω(·), γ2 is multiplied by the next m2 components, and so on.
We remark that this update rule immediately distinguishes gradient-based learning in games
from gradient descent. By definition, the dynamics of gradient descent in single-agent settings
always correspond to gradient flows —i.e x evolves according to an ordinary differential equation
of the form x˙ = −∇φ(x) for some function φ : Rd → R. Outside of the class of exact potential
games we defined in Section 3, the dynamics of players’ actions in games are not afforded this
luxury—indeed, Dω is not in general symmetric (which is a necessary condition for a gradient
flow). This makes the potential limiting behaviors of x˙ = −ω(x) highly non-trivial to characterize
in general-sum games.
The structure present in a gradient-flow implies strong properties on the limiting behaviors of
x. In particular, it precludes the existence of limit cycles or periodic orbits (limiting behaviors of
dynamical systems where the state of system cycles infinitely through a set of states with a finite
period) and chaos (an attribute of nonlinear dynamical systems where the system’s behavior can
vary extremely due to slight changes in initial position) Sastry (1999). We note that both of these
behaviors can occur in the dynamics of gradient-based learning algorithms in games2.
Despite the wide breadth of behaviors that gradient dynamics can exhibit in competitive settings,
we are still make statements about convergence (and non-convergence) to certain types of equilibria.
To do so, we first make the following standard assumptions on the smoothness of the cost functions
fi and the magnitude of the agents’ learning rates γi.
Assumption 1 For each i ∈ I, fi ∈ Cs(X,R) with s ≥ 2, supx∈X ‖Dω(x)‖2 ≤ L < ∞, and
0 < γi < 1/L where ‖ · ‖2 is the induced 2-norm.
Given these assumptions, the following result rules out converging to strict saddle points.
2. The Van der Pol oscillator and Lorenz system (see e.g Sastry (1999)) can be seen as the resulting gradient dynamics
in a 2-player and 3-player general-sum game respectively. The first is a classic example of a system where players
converge to cycles and the second is an example of a chaotic system.
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Theorem 12 Let fi : X → R and γ satisfy Assumption 1. Suppose thatX = X1×· · ·×Xn ⊆ Rm
is open and convex. If g(X) ⊂ X , the set of initial conditions x ∈ X from which competitive
gradient-based learning converges to strict saddle points is of measure zero.
We remark that the above theorem holds for X = X1 × · · · × Xn = Rm in particular, since
g(X) ⊂ X holds trivially in this case. It is also important to note that, as we point out in Section 3,
local Nash equilibria can be strict saddle points. Thus, all local Nash equilibria that are strict
saddle points for x˙ = −ω(x) are avoided almost surely by gradient-play even with oracle gradient
access and random initializations. This holds even when players randomly initialize uniformly in an
arbitrarily small ball around such Nash equilibria. In Section 5, we show that many linear quadratic
dynamic games have a strict saddle point as their global Nash equilibrium. For brevity, we provide
the proof of Theorem 12 in Appendix A, and provide a proof sketch below.
Proof [Proof sketch of Theorem 12] The core of the proof is the celebrated stable manifold theorem
from dynamical systems theory, presented in Theorem 16. We construct the set of initial positions
from which gradient-play will converge to strict saddle points and then use the stable manifold
theorem to show that the set must have measure zero in the players’ joint strategy space. Therefore,
with a random initialization players will never evolve solely on the stable manifold of strict saddles
and they will consequently diverge from such equilibria.
To be able to invoke the stable manifold theorem, we first show that the mapping g : Rm → Rm
is a diffeomorphism, which is non-trivial due to the fact that we have allowed each agent to have
their own learning rate γi and Dω is not symmetric. We then iteratively construct the set of initial-
izations that will converge to strict saddle points under the game dynamics. By the stable manifold
theorem, and the fact that g is a diffeomorphism, the stable manifold of a strict saddle point must be
measure zero. Then, by induction we show that the set of all initial points that converge to a strict
saddle point must also be measure zero.
In potential games we can strengthen the above non-convergence result and give convergence
guarantees.
Corollary 13 Consider a potential game (f1, . . . , fn) on open, convex X = X1× · · · ×Xn ⊆ Rm
and where each fi ∈ Cs(X,R) for s ≥ 3. Let ν be a prior measure with support X which is
absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and assume limt→∞ gt(x) exists. Then,
under Assumption 1, competitive gradient-based learning converges to non-degenerate differential
Nash equilibria almost surely. Moreover, the non-degenerate differential Nash to which it converges
is generically a local Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 13 guarantees that in potential games, gradient-play will converge to a differential
Nash equilibrium. Combining this with Theorem 4.1 guarantees that the differential Nash equilib-
rium it converges to is a local minimizer of the potential function. A simple implication of this
result is that gradient-based learning in potential games cannot exhibit limit cycles or chaos.
Of note is the fact that the agents do not need to be performing gradient-based learning on φ
to converge to Nash almost surely. That is, they do not need to know the function φ; they simply
need to follow the derivative of their own cost with respect to their own choice variable, and they
are guaranteed to converge to a local Nash equilibrium that is a local minimizer of the potential
function.
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We note that convergence to Nash equilibria is a known characteristic of gradient-play in poten-
tial games. However, our analysis also highlights that gradient-play will avoid a subset of the Nash
equilibria of the game. This is surprising given the particularly strong structural properties of such
games. The proof for Corollary 13 is provided in Appendix A and follows from Proposition 10,
Theorem 12, and the fact that Dω is symmetric in potential games.
4.1.1 IMPLICATIONS AND INTERPRETATION OF CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
Both Theorem 12 and Corollary 13 show that gradient-play in multi-agent settings avoids strict
saddles almost surely even in the deterministic setting. Combined with the analysis in Section 3
which shows that (local) Nash equilibria can be strict saddles of the dynamics for general-sum
games, this implies that a subset of the Nash equilibria are almost surely avoided by individual
gradient-play, a potentially undesirable outcome in view of Q1 (whether all Nash equilibria are
attracting for the learning dynamics). In Section 5, we show that the global Nash equilibrium is a
saddle point of the gradient dynamics in a large number of randomly sampled LQ dynamic games.
This suggests that policy gradient algorithms may fail to converge in such games, which is highly
undesired. This is in stark contrast to the single agent setting where policy gradient has been shown
to converge to the unique solution of LQR problems Fazel et al. (2018).
In Section 3, we also showed that local Nash equilibria of potential games can be strict saddles
points of the potential function. Non-convergence to such points in potential games is not necessar-
ily a bad result since this in turn implies convergence to a local minimizer of the potential function
(as shown in Lee et al. (2016); Panageas and Piliouras (2016)) which are guaranteed to be local
Nash equilibria of the game. However, these results do imply that one cannot answer “yes” to Q1
in potential games since some of the Nash equilibria are not attracting under gradient-play.
In zero-sum games, where local Nash equilibria cannot be strict saddle points of the gradient
dynamics, our result suggests that eventually gradient-based learning algorithms will escape saddle
points of the dynamics.
The almost sure avoidance of all equilibria that are saddle points of the dynamics further implies
that if (??) converges to a critical point x, then x ∈ LASE(ω)—i.e., x is locally asymptotically stable
for x˙ = −ω(x). This may not be a desired property however, since we showed in Section 3 that
zero-sum and general-sum games both admit non-Nash LASE.
Since gradient-play in games generally does not result in a gradient flow, other types of limiting
behaviors such as limit cycles can occur in gradient-based learning dynamics. Theorem 12 says
nothing about convergence to other limiting behaviors. In the following sections we prove that the
results described in this section extend to the stochastic gradient setting. We also formally define
periodic orbits in the context of dynamical systems and state stronger results on avoidance of some
more complex limiting behaviors like linearly unstable limit cycles.
4.2 Stochastic Setting
We now analyze the stochastic case in which agents are assumed to have an unbiased estimator for
their gradient. The results in this section allow us to extend the results from the deterministic setting
to a setting where each agent builds an estimate of the gradient of their loss at the current set of
strategies from potentially noisy observations of the environment. Thus, we are able to analyze the
limiting behavior of a class of commonly used machine learning algorithms for competitive, multi-
agent settings. In particular, we show that agents will almost surely not converge to strict saddle
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Class Gradient Learning Rule
Gradient-Play x+i = xi − γiDifi(xi, x−i)
GANs θ
+ = θ − γE[DθL(θ, w)]
w+ = w + γE[DwL(θ, w)]
MA Policy Gradient x+i = xi − γiE[DiJi(xi, x−i)]
Individual Q-learning q+i (ui) = qi(ui) + γi(ri(ui, pi−i(qi, q−i))− qi(ui))
MA Gradient Bandits x+i,` = xi,` + γiE[βiRi(ui, u−i)|ui = `], ` = 1, . . . ,mi
MA Experts x+i,` = xi,` + γiE[Ri(ui, u−i)|ui = `], ` = 1, . . . ,mi
Table 1: Example problem classes that fit into competitive gradient-based learning rules. Details on
the derivation of these update rules as gradient-based learning schemes is provided in Appendix C.
points. In Appendix B.1, we show that the gradient dynamics will actually avoid more general
limiting behaviors called linearly unstable cycles which we define formally.
To perform our analysis, we make use of tools and ideas from the literature on stochastic ap-
proximations (see e.g Borkar (2008)). We note that the convergence of stochastic gradient schemes
in the single-agent setting has been extensively studied Robbin (1971); Pemantle (1990); Bottou
(2010); Mertikopoulos and Staudigl (2018). We extend this analysis to the behavior of stochastic
gradient algorithms in games.
We assume that each agent updates their strategy using the update rule
xi,t+1 = xi,t − γi,t(Difi(xi,t, x−i,t) + wi,t+1) (5)
for some zero-mean, finite-variance stochastic process {wi,t}. Before presenting the results for the
stochastic case, let us comment on the different learning algorithms that fit into this framework.
4.2.1 EXAMPLES OF STOCHASTIC GRADIENT-BASED LEARNING
The stochastic gradient-based learning setting we study is general enough to include a variety of
commonly used multi-agent learning algorithms. The classes of algorithms we include is hardly an
exhaustive list, and indeed many extensions and altogether different algorithms exist that can be con-
sidered members of this class. In Table 1, we provide the gradient-based update rule for six different
example classes of learning problems: (i) gradient-play in non-cooperative continuous games, (ii)
GANs, (iii) multi-agent policy gradient, (iv) individual Q-learning, (v) multi-agent gradient bandits,
and (vi) multi-agent experts. We provide a detailed analysis of these different algorithms including
the derivation of the gradient-based update rules along with some interesting numerical examples
in Appendix C. In each of these cases, one can view an agent employing the given algorithm as
building an unbiased estimate of their gradient from their observation of the environment.
For example, in multi-agent policy gradient (see, e.g., (Sutton and Barto, 2017, Chapter 13)),
agents’ costs are defined as functions of a parameter vector xi that parameterize their policies pii(xi).
The parameters xi are agent i’s choice variable. By following the gradient of their loss function,
they aim to tune the parameters in order to converge to an optimal policy pii. Perhaps surprisingly,
it is not necessary for agent i to have access to pi−i(x−i) or even x−i in order for them to construct
an unbiased estimate of the gradient of their loss with respect to their own choice variable xi as
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long as they observe the sequence of actions, say u−i,t, of all other agents generated. These actions
are implicitly determined by the other agents’ policies pi−i(x−i)(·). Hence, in this case if agent i
observes {(rj,t, uj,t, sj,t), ∀ j ∈ I} where (rj , uj , sj) are the reward, action, and state of agent j,
then this is enough to construct an unbiased estimate of their gradient. We provide further details
on multi-agent policy gradient in Appendix C.
4.2.2 STOCHASTIC GRADIENT RESULTS
Returning to the analysis of (5), we make the following standard assumptions on the noise processes
Robbin (1971); Robbins and Siegmund (1985).
Assumption 2 The stochastic process {wi,t+1} satisfies the assumptions E[wi,t+1| F ti ] = 0, t ≥
0 and E[‖wi,t+1‖2| F ti ] ≤ σ2 < ∞ a.s., for t ≥ 0, where Fi,t is an increasing family of σi-
fields—i.e. filtration, or history generated by the sequence of random variables—given by Fi,t =
σi(xi,k, wi,k, k ≤ t), t ≥ 0.
We also make new assumptions on the players’ step-sizes. These are standard assumptions in the
stochastic approximation literature and are needed to ensure that the noise processes are asymptoti-
cally controlled.
Assumption 3 For each i ∈ I, fi ∈ Cs(X,R) with s ≥ 2, Difi is Li–Lipschitz with 0 < Li <∞,
the step-sizes satisfy γi,t ≡ γt for all i ∈ I and
∑
t γt =∞ and
∑
t(γt)
2 <∞, and supt ‖xt‖ <∞
a.s.
Let (a)+ = max{a, 0} and a · b denotes the inner product. The following theorem extends the
results of Theorem 12 to the stochastic gradient dynamics in games.
Theorem 14 Consider a game (f1, . . . , fn) on X = X1 × · · · × Xn = Rm. Suppose each agent
i ∈ I adopts a stochastic gradient algorithm that satisfies Assumptions 2 and 3. Further, suppose
that for each i ∈ I, there exists a constant bi > 0 such that E[(wi,t · v)+|Fi,t] ≥ bi for every unit
vector v ∈ Rmi . Then, competitive stochastic gradient-based learning converges to strict saddle
points of the game on a set of measure zero.
The proof follows directly from showing that (5) satisfies Theorem 17, provided the assumptions of
the theorem hold. The assumption that E[(wi,t · v)+|Fi,t] ≥ bi rules out degenerate cases where the
noise forces the stochastic dynamics onto the stable manifold of strict saddle points.
Theorem 14 implies that the dynamics of stochastic gradient-based learning defined in (5), have
the same limiting properties as the deterministic dynamics vis-a`-vis saddle points. Thus, the impli-
cations described in Section 4.1.1 extend to the stochastic gradient setting. In particular, stochastic
gradient-based algorithms will avoid a non-negligible subset of the Nash equilibria in general-sum
and potential games. Further, in zero-sum and general-sum games, if the players fo converge to a
critical point, that point may be a non-Nash equilibrium.
4.2.3 FURTHER CONVERGENCE RESULTS FOR STOCHASTIC GRADIENT-PLAY IN GAMES
As we demonstrated in Section 4.1, outside of potential games, the dynamics of gradient-based
learning algorithms in games are not gradient flows. As such, the players’ actions can converge
to more complex sets than simple equilibria. A particularly prominent class of limiting behaviors
for dynamical systems are known as limit cycles (see e.g Sastry (1999)). Limit cycles (or periodic
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orbits) are sets of states S such that each state x ∈ S is visited at periodic intervals ad infinitum
under the dynamics. Thus, if the gradient-based algorithms converge to a limit cycle they will
cycle infinitely through the same sequence of actions. Like equilibria, limit cycles can be stable
or unstable under the dynamics x˙ = −ω(x), meaning that the dynamics can either converge to or
diverge from them depending on their initializations.
We remark that the existence of oscillatory behaviors and limit cycles has been observed in the
dynamics of of gradient-based learning in various settings like the training of Generative Adversarial
Networks Daskalakis et al. (2017), and multiplicative weights in finite action games Mertikopoulos
et al. (2018). We simply emphasize that the existence of such limiting behaviors is due to the fact
that the dynamics are no longer gradient flows. This fact also allows for other complex limiting
behaviors like chaos3 to exist in the dynamics of gradient-based learning in games. We also show
in Appendix B.1 that gradient-based learning avoids some limit cycles.
In Appendix B.1, we formalize the notion of a limit cycle and its stability in the stochastic
setting. Using these concepts, we then provide an analogous theorem to Theorem 14 which states
that competitive stochastic gradient-based learning converges to linearly unstable limit cycles—a
parallel notion to strict saddle points but pertaining to more general limit sets—on a set of measure
zero, provided that analogous assumptions to those in the statement of Theorem 14 hold. Providing
such guarantees requires a bit more mathematical formalism, and as such we leave the details of
these results to Appendix B.
In pursuit of a more general class of games with desirable convergence properties, in Ap-
pendix B.2 we also introduce a generalization of potential games, namely Morse-Smale games, for
which the combined gradient dynamics correspond to a Morse-Smale vector field Hirsch (1976);
Palis and Smale (1970). In such games players are guaranteed to converge to only (linearly stable)
cycles or equilibria. In such games, however, players may still converge to non-Nash equilibria and
avoid a subset of the Nash equilibria.
5. Saddle Point LNE in LQ Dynamic Games
In this section, we present empirical results that show that a non-negligible subset of two-player
LQ games have local Nash equilibria that are strict saddle points of the gradient dynamics. LQ
games serve as good benchmarks for analyzing the limiting behavior of gradient-play in a non-
trivial setting since they are known to admit global Nash equilibria that can be found be solving a
coupled set of Riccati equations Basar and Olsder (1998). LQ games can also be cast as multi-agent
reinforcement learning problems where each agent has a policy that is a linear function of the state
and a quadratic reward function. Gradient-play in LQ games can therefore be seen as a form of
policy gradient.
The empirical results we now present imply that, even in the relatively straightforward case
of linear dynamics, linear feedback policies, and quadratic costs, policy gradient multi-agent rein-
forcement learning would be unable to find the local Nash equilibrium in a non-negligible subset of
problems.
3. A general term used to characterize dynamical systems where arbitrarily small perturbations in the initial conditions
lead to drastically different solutions to the differential equations
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LQ game setup For simplicity, we consider two-player LQ games in R2. Consider a discrete time
dynamical system defined by
z(t+ 1) = Az(t) +B1u1(t) +B2u2(t) (6)
where z(t) ∈ R2 is the state at time t, u1(t) and u2(t) are the control inputs of players 1 and 2,
respectively, and A, B1, and B2 are the system matrices. We assume that player i searches for a
linear feedback policy of the form ui(t) = −Kiz(t) that minimizes their loss which is given by
fi(z0, u1, u2) =
∑∞
t=0 z(t)
TQiz(t) + ui(t)
TRiui(t)
whereQi  0 andRi  0 are the cost matrices on the state and input, respectively. We note that the
two players are coupled through the dynamics since z(t) is constrained to obey the update equation
(6). The vector of player derivatives is given by ω(K1,K2) = (D1f1(K1,K2), D2f2(K1,K2))
where
Difi(K1,K2) = (RiiKi +B
T
i Pi(B1K1 +B2K2)−BTi PiA)
∑∞
t=0 z(t)z(t)
T , i ∈ {1, 2}.
Note that there is a slight abuse of notation here as we are treating Difi as a matrix and as the
vectorization of a matrix. The matrices P1 and P2 can be found by solving the Riccati equations
Pi = (A−B1K1 −B2K2)TPi(A−B1K1 −B2K2) +KTi RiKi +Qi, i ∈ {1, 2},
for a given (K1,K2). As shown in Basar and Olsder (1998), global Nash equilibria of LQ games
can be found by solving coupled Ricatti equations. Under the following assumption, this can be
done using an analogous method to the method of Lyapunov iterations outlined in Li and Gajic
(1995) for continuous time LQ games.
Assumption 4 Either (A,B1,
√
Q1) or (A,B2,
√
Q2) is stabilizable-detectable.
Further information on the uniqueness of Nash equilibria in LQ games and the method of Lya-
punov iterations can be found in Basar and Olsder (1998) and Li and Gajic (1995) respectively.
Generating LQ games with strict saddle point Nash equilibria Without loss of generality, we
assume (A,B1,
√
Q1) is stabilizable-detectable. Given that we have a method of finding the global
Nash equilibrium of the LQ game, we now present our experimental setup.
We fix B1, B2, Q1, and R1 and parametrize Q2, and R2 by q and r respectively. The shared
dynamics matrix A has entries that are sampled from the uniform distribution supported on (0, 1).
For each value of the parameters b, q, and r, we randomly sample 1000 different A matrices. Then,
for each LQ game defined in terms of each of the sets of parameters, we find the optimal feed-
back matrices (K∗1 ,K∗2 ) using the method of Lyapunov iterations, and we numerically approximate
Dω(K∗1 ,K∗2 ) using auto-differentiation tools and check its eigenvalues.
The exact values of the matrices are defined as follows: A ∈ R2×2 with each of the entries aij
sampled from the uniform distribution on (0, 1),
B1 =
[
1
1
]
, B2 =
[
0
1
]
, Q1 =
[
0.01 0
0 1
]
, Q2 =
[
1 0
0 q
]
, R1 = 0.01, R2 = r.
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Figure 2: Frequency (out of 1000) of randomly sampled LQ games with global Nash equilibria
that are avoided by policy-gradient. The experiment was run 10 times and the average frequency is
shown by the solid line. The shaded region demarcates the 95% confidence interval of the experi-
ment. (left) r is varied in (0, 1), q = 0.01. (right) q is varied in (0, 1), r = 0.1.
The results for various combinations of the parameters q and r are shown in Figure 2. For all
of the different parameter configurations considered, we found that in anywhere from 0%− 25% of
the randomly sampled LQ games, there was a global Nash equilibrium that was a strict saddle point
of the gradient dynamics. Of particular interest is the fact that for all values of q and r we tested, at
least 5% of the LQ games had a global Nash equilibrium with the strict saddle property. In the worst
case, around 25% of the LQ games for the given values of q and r admitted such Nash equilibria.
Remark 15 These empirical observations imply that multi-agent policy gradient, even in the rela-
tively straightforward setting of linear dynamics, linear policies, and quadratic costs, has no guar-
antees of convergence to the global Nash equilibria in a non-negligible number of games. Further
investigation is warranted to validate this fact theoretically. This in turn supports the idea that for
more complicated cost functions, policy classes, and dynamics, local Nash equilibria with the strict
saddle property are likely to be very common.
6. Discussion and Future Directions
In this paper we provided answers to the following two questions for classes of gradient-based
learning algorithms:
Q1. Are all attractors of the learning algorithms employed by agents equilibria relevant to the
underlying game?
Q2. Are all equilibria relevant to the game also attractors of the learning algorithms agents em-
ploy?
We answered these questions in general-sum, zero-sum, and potential games without imposing
structure on the game outside regularity conditions on the cost functions by exploiting the obser-
vation that gradient-based learning dynamics are not gradient flows. Our analysis, was shown in
Section C to apply to a number of commonly used methods in multi-agent learning.
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6.1 Links with Prior Work
As we noted, previous work on learning in games in both the game theory literature, and more
recently from the machine learning community, has largely focused on Q1, though some recent
work has analyzed Q2 in the setting of zero-sum games.
In the seminal work by Rosen Rosen (1965), n–player concave or monotone games are shown
to either admit a unique Nash equilibrium or a continuum of Nash equilibria, all of which are
attracting under gradient-play. The structure present in these games rules out the existence of non-
Nash equilibria.
Two-player, finite-action bilinear games have also been extensively studied. In Singh et al.
(2000), the authors investigate the convergence of the gradient dynamics in such games. Addition-
ally, the dynamics of other (non gradient-based) algorithms like multiplicative weights have been
studied in Hommes and Ochea (2012) among many others. In such settings, the structure guaran-
tees that there exists a unique global Nash equilibrium and no other critical points of the gradient
dynamics. As such, non-Nash equilibria, cannot exist.
In the study of learning dynamics in the class of zero-sum games, it has been shown that cycles
can be attractors of the dynamics (see, e.g., Mertikopoulos et al. (2018); Wesson and Rand (2016);
Hommes and Ochea (2012)). Concurrently with our results, Daskalakis and Panageas (2018) also
showed the existence of non-Nash attracting equilibria in this setting.
In more general settings, there has been some analysis of the limiting behavior of gradient-play
though the focus has been for the most part, on giving sufficient conditions under which Nash equi-
libria are attracting under gradient-play. For example, Ratliff et al. (2013, 2014, 2016), introduced
the notion of a differential Nash equilibrium which is characterized by first and second order condi-
tions on the players’ individual cost functions and which we made extensive use of. Following this
body of work, Mertikopoulos and Zhou (2019) also investigated the local convergence of gradient-
play in continuous games. They showed that if a Nash equilibrium satisfies a property known as
variational stability, the equilibrium is attracting under gradient play. In twice continuously dif-
ferentiable games, this condition coincides exactly with the definition of stable differential Nash
equilibria. Though these works analyze a general class of games, the focus of the analysis is solely
on the local characterization and computation (via gradient play) of local Nash equilibria. As such,
the issues of non-convergence that we show in this paper were not discussed.
6.2 Open Questions
Our results suggest that gradient-play in multi-agent settings has fundamental problems. Depending
on the players’ costs, in general games and even potential games, which have a particularly nice
structure, a subset of the Nash equilibria will be almost surely avoided by gradient-based learning
when the agents randomly initialize their first action. In zero-sum and general-sum games, even if
the algorithms do converge, they may have converged to a point that has no game theoretic relevance,
namely a non-Nash locally asymptotically stable equilibrium.
Lastly, these results show that limit cycles persist even under a stochastic update scheme. This
explains the empirical observations of limit cycles in gradient dynamics presented in Daskalakis
et al. (2017); Leslie and Collins (2005); Hommes and Ochea (2012). It also implies that gradient-
based learning in multi-agent reinforcement learning, multi-armed bandits, generative adversarial
networks, and online optimization all admit limit cycles under certain loss functions. Our empirical
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results show that these problems are not merely of theoretical interest, but also have great relevance
in practice.
Which classes of games have all Nash being attracting for gradient-play and which classes
preclude the existence of non-Nash equilibria is an open and particularly interesting question. Fur-
ther, the question of whether gradient-based algorithms can be constructed for which only game-
theoretically relevant equilibria are attracting is of particular importance as gradient-based learning
is increasingly implemented in game theoretic settings. Indeed, more generally, as learning algo-
rithms are increasingly deployed in markets and other competitive environments understanding and
dealing with such theoretical issues will become increasingly important.
Appendix A. Proofs of the Main Results
This appendix contains the full proofs of the results in the paper.
A.1 Proofs on Links Between Dynamical Systems and Games
We begin with a proof of Proposition 5 that all differential Nash equilibria are either strict saddle
points or asymptotically stable equilibria of the gradient dynamics. This relies mainly on the defini-
tions of strict saddle points, locally asymptotically stable equilibria, and non-degenerate differential
Nash equilibria and simple linear algebra.
Proof [Proof of Proposition 5] Suppose that x ∈ X is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilib-
rium. We claim that tr(Dω(x)) > 0. Since x is a differential Nash equilibrium, D2i fi(x)  0
for each i ∈ I; these are the diagonal blocks of Dω(x). Further D2i fi(x)  0 implies that
tr(D2i fi(x)) > 0. Since tr(Dω) =
∑n
i=1 tr(D
2
i fi(x)), tr(Dω(x)) > 0. Thus, it is not possi-
ble for all the eigenvalues to have negative real part. Since x is non-degenerate, det(Dω(x)) 6= 0
so that none of the eigenvalues can have zero real part. Hence, at least one eigenvalue has strictly
positive real part.
To complete the proof, we show that the conditions for non-degenerate differential Nash equilib-
rium are not sufficient to guarantee that x is locally asymptotically stable for the gradient dynamics—
that is, not all eigenvalues of Dω(x) have strictly positive real part. We do this by construct-
ing a class of games with the strict saddle point property. Consider a class of two player games
G = (f1, f2) on R× R defined as follows:
(f1(x1, x2), f2(x1, x2)) =
(a
2
x21 + bx1x2,
d
2
x22 + cx1x2
)
.
In this game, the Jacobian of the gradient dynamics is given by
Dω(x) =
[
a b
c d
]
(7)
with a, b, c, d ∈ R. If x is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria, a, d > 0 and det(Dω(x)) 6=
0 which implies that ad 6= cb. Choosing c, d such that ad < cb will guarantee that one of the
eigenvalues of Dω(x) is negative and the other is positive, making x a strict saddle point. This
shows that non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria can be strict saddle points of the combined
gradient dynamics.
Hence, for any game (f1, . . . , fn), a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium is either a lo-
cally asymptotically stable equilibrium or a strict saddle point, but it not strictly unstable or strictly
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marginally stable (i.e. having eigenvalues all on the imaginary axis).
The proof of Proposition 8, which claims that all differential Nash equilibria in zero-sum games
are locally asymptotically stable, again just relies on basic linear algebra and the definition of a
differential Nash equilibrium.
Proof [Proof of Proposition 8] Consider a two player game (f,−f) on X1 × X2 = Rm with
Xi = Rmi . For such a game,
Dω(x) =
[
D21f(x) D21f(x)
−D12f(x) −D22f(x)
]
.
Note that D21f(x) = (D12f(x))T . Suppose that x = (x1, x2) is a differential Nash equilibrium
and let v = [v1, v2] ∈ Rm with v1 ∈ Rm1 and v2 ∈ Rm2 . Then, vTDω(x)v = vT1 D21f(x)v1 −
vT2 D
2
2f(x)v2 > 0 since D
2
1f(x)  0 and −D22f(x)  0 for x, a differential Nash equilibrium.
Since v is arbitrary, this implies that Dω(x) is positive definite and hence, clearly non-degenerate.
Thus, for two-player zero-sum games, all differential Nash equilibria are both non-degenerate dif-
ferential Nash equilibria and locally asymptotically stable equilibria of x˙ = −ω(x)
The proof that all locally asymptotically stable equilibria in potential games are differential
Nash equilibria relies on the symmetry of Dω in potential games.
Proof [Proof of Proposition 10] The proof follows from the definition of a potential game. Since
(f1, . . . , fn) is a potential game, it admits a potential function φ such that Difi(x) = Diφ(x)
for all x. This, in turn, implies that at a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium of x˙ = −ω(x),
Dω(x) = D2φ(x), where D2φ is the Hessian matrix of the function φ. Further D2φ(x) must have
strictly positive eigenvalues for x to be a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium of x˙ = −ω(x).
Since the Hessian matrix of a function must be symmetric,D2φ(x), must be positive definite, which
through Sylvester’s criterion ensures that each of the diagonal blocks of D2φ(x) is positive definite.
Thus, we have that the existence of a potential function guarantees that the only locally asymptoti-
cally stable equilibria of x˙ = −ω(x), are differential Nash equilibria.
A.2 Proofs for Deterministic Setting
We now present the proof of Theorem 12 and its corollaries. The proof of relies on the celebrated
stable manifold theorem (Shub, 1978, Theorem III.7), Smale (1967). Given a map φ, we use the
notation φt = φ ◦ · · · ◦ φ to denote the t–times composition of φ.
Theorem 16 (Center and Stable Manifolds (Shub, 1978, Theorem III.7), Smale (1967)) Let x0
be a fixed point for the Cr local diffeomorphism f : U → Rd where U ⊂ Rd is an open neighbor-
hood of x0 in Rd and r ≥ 1. Let Es ⊕ Ec ⊕ Eu be the invariant splitting of Rd into generalized
eigenspaces of Dφ(x0) corresponding to eigenvalues of absolute value less than one, equal to one,
and greater than one. To the Dφ(x0) invariant subspace Es ⊕ Ec there is an associated local φ–
invariantCr embedded discW csloc called the local stable center manifold of dimension dim(E
s⊕Ec)
and ballB around x0 such that φ(W csloc)∩B ⊂W csloc, and if φt(x) ∈ B for all t ≥ 0, then x ∈W scloc.
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Some parts of the proof follow similar arguments to the proofs of results in Lee et al. (2016);
Panageas and Piliouras (2016) which apply to (single-agent) gradient-based optimization. Due to
the different learning rates employed by the agents and the introduction of the differential game
form ω, the proof differs.
Proof [Proof of Theorem 12] The proof is composed of two parts: (a) the map g is a diffeomorphism,
and (b) application of the stable manifold theorem to conclude that the set of initial conditions is
measure zero.
(a) g is diffeomorphism We claim the mapping g : Rm → Rm is a diffeomorphism. If we can
show that g is invertible and a local diffeomorphism, then the claim follows. Consider x 6= y and
suppose g(y) = g(x) so that y−x = γ ·(ω(y)−ω(x)). The assumption supx∈Rm ‖Dω(x)‖2 ≤ L <
∞ implies that ω satisfies the Lipschitz condition on Rm. Hence, ‖ω(y) − ω(x)‖2 ≤ L‖y − x‖2.
Let Γ = diag(Γ1, . . . ,Γn) where Γi = diag((γi)
mi
j=1)—that is, Γi is an mi ×mi diagonal matrix
with γi repeated on the diagonal mi times. Then, ‖x − y‖2 ≤ L‖Γ‖2‖y − x‖2 < ‖y − x‖2 since
‖Γ‖2 = maxi |γi| < 1/L.
Now, observe that Dg = I − ΓDω(x). If Dg is invertible, then the implicit function theo-
rem (Lee, 2012, Theorem C.40) implies that g is a local diffeomorphism. Hence, it suffices to show
that ΓDω(x) does not have an eigenvalue of 1. Indeed, letting ρ(A) be the spectral radius of a
matrix A, we know in general that ρ(A) ≤ ‖A‖ for any square matrix A and induced operator norm
‖ · ‖ so that ρ(ΓDω(x)) ≤ ‖ΓDω(x)‖2 ≤ ‖Γ‖2 supx∈Rm ‖Dω(x)‖2 < maxi |γi|L < 1 Of course,
the spectral radius is the maximum absolute value of the eigenvalues, so that the above implies that
all eigenvalues of ΓDω(x) have absolute value less than 1.
Since g is injective by the preceding argument, its inverse is well-defined and since g is a local
diffeomorphism on Rm, it follows that g−1 is smooth on Rm. Thus, g is a diffeomorphism.
(b) Application of the stable manifold theorem Consider all critical points to the game—i.e.Xc =
{x ∈ X| ω(x) = 0}. For each p ∈ Xc, let Bp be the open ball derived from Theorem 16 and let
B = ∪pBp. Since X ⊆ Rm, Lindelo˜f’s lemma Kelley (1955)—every open cover has a countable
subcover—gives a countable subcover of B. That is, for a countable set of critical points {pi}∞i=1
with pi ∈ Xc, we have that B = ∪∞i=1Bpi .
Starting from some point x0 ∈ X , if gradient-based learning converges to a strict saddle point,
then there exists a t0 and index i such that gt(x0) ∈ Bpi for all t ≥ t0. Again, applying Theorem 16
and using that g(X) ⊂ X—which we note is obviously true if X = Rm—we get that gt(x0) ∈
W csloc ∩X .
Using the fact that g is invertible, we can iteratively construct the sequence of sets defined by
W1(pi) = g
−1(W csloc ∩ X) and Wk+1(pi) = g−1(Wk(pi) ∩ X). Then we have that x0 ∈ Wt(pi)
for all t ≥ t0. The set X0 = ∪∞i=1 ∪∞t=0 Wt(pi) contains all the initial points in X such that
gradient-based learning converges to a strict saddle. Since pi is a strict saddle, I − ΓDω(pi) has
an eigenvalue greater than 1. This implies that the co-dimension of Eu is strictly less than m.
(i.e. dim(W csloc) < m). Hence, W
cs
loc ∩X has Lebesgue measure zero in Rm.
Using again that g is a diffeomorphism, g−1 ∈ C1 so that it is locally Lipschitz and locally
Lipschitz maps are null set preserving. Hence, Wk(pi) has measure zero for all k by induction so
that X0 is a measure zero set since it is a countable union of measure zero sets.
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The proof of Corollary 13 follows from the symmetry of Dω in potential games, and our obser-
vations in Section 3.
Proof [Proof of Corollary 13] Since the game admits a potential function φ, there is a transformation
of coordinates such that agents following the dynamics xt+1 = xt−γω(xt) converge to the same
equilibria as the gradient dynamics xt+1 = xt − γ Dφ(xt). Hence, the analysis of the gradient-
based learning scheme reduces to analyzing gradient-based optimization of φ. Moreover, existence
of a potential function also implies that Dijfj ≡ Djifi so that Dω is symmetric. Indeed, writing
ω(x) as the differential form
∑n
i=1Difi(x)dxi and noting that d◦d = 0 for the differential operator
d, we have that d(ω) =
∑
i d(Difi) ∧ dxi =
∑
i,j:j>i (Dijfj −Djifi) dxi ∧ dxj = 0 where ∧
is the standard exterior product Lee (2012). Symmetry of Dω implies that all periodic orbits are
equilibria—i.e. the dynamics do not possess any limit cycles. By Theorem 12, the set of initial
points that converge to strict saddle points is of measure zero. Since all the stable critical points
of the dynamics are equilibria, with the assumption that limt→∞ gt(x) exists for all x ∈ X , we
have that Pν
[
limt→∞ gt(x) = x∗
]
= 1 where x∗ is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium
which is generically a local Nash equilibrium Ratliff et al. (2014).
A.3 Classical Results from Dynamical Systems
The remaining results use the following classical result from dynamical systems theory. Consider
a general stochastic approximation framework xt+1 = xt + γt(h(xt)) + t for h : X → TX with
h ∈ C2 and where X ⊂ Rd and where TX denotes the tangent space.
Theorem 17 (Theorem 1 Pemantle (1990)) Suppose γt is Ft–measurable and E[wt|Ft] = 0. Let
the stochastic process {xt}t≥0 be defined as above for some sequence of random variables {t}
and {γt}. Let p ∈ X with h(p) = 0 and let W be a neighborhood of p. Assume that there
are constants η ∈ (1/2, 1] and c1, c2, c3, c4 > 0 for which the following conditions are satisfied
whenever xt ∈W and t sufficiently large: (i) p is a linear unstable critical point, (ii) c1/tη ≤ γt ≤
c2/t
η, (iii) E[(wt · v)+|Ft] ≥ c3/tη for every unit vector v ∈ TX , and (iv) ‖wt‖2 ≤ c4/tη. Then
P (xt → p) = 0.
Appendix B. Expanded Results in the Stochastic Setting
In this appendix , we provide extended results in the stochastic setting that require more mathemat-
ical formalism than the main body of the paper. In addition, we introduce a new class of games
that generalize potential games and have stronger convergence guarantees than the broader class of
general-sum continuous games.
B.1 Avoidance of Repelling Sets
To show that stochastic gradient-based learning avoids of more general limiting behaviors than
saddle points, we need further assumptions on our underlying space—i.e. we need the underlying
decision spaces of each agent—i.e. Xi for each i ∈ I—to be smooth, compact manifolds without
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boundary4. The stochastic process {xn} which follows (5) is defined on X—that is, xn ∈ X for all
n ≥ 0. As before, it is natural to compare sample points {xn} to solutions of x˙ = −ω(x) where we
think of (5) as a noisy approximation. The asymptotic behavior of {xn} can indeed be described by
the asymptotic behavior of the flow generated by ω.
We also need a formal notion of cycles. A non-stationary periodic orbit of ω is called a cycle.
Let ξ ⊂ X be a cycle of period T > 0. Denote by ΦT the flow corresponding to ω. For any
x ∈ ξ, spec(DΦT (x)) = {1} ∪ C(ξ) where C(ξ) is the set of characteristic multipliers. We say ξ
is hyperbolic if no element of C(ξ) is on the complex unit circle. Further, if C(ξ) is strictly inside
the unit circle, ξ is called linearly stable and, on the other hand, if C(ξ) has at least one element on
the outside of the unit circle—that is, DΦT (x) for x ∈ ξ has an eigenvalue with real part strictly
greater than 1—then ξ is called linearly unstable. The latter is the analog of strict saddle points
in the context of periodic orbits. We denote by {xt} sample paths of the process (5) and L({xt})
is the limit set of any sequence {xt}t≥0 which is defined in the usual way as all p ∈ X such that
limk→∞ xtk = p for some sequence tk → ∞. It was shown in Benaı¨m (1996) that under less
restrictive assumptions than Assumptions 2 and 3, L({xt}) is contained in the chain recurrent set
of ω and L({xt}) is a non-empty, compact and connected set invariant under the flow of ω.
Theorem 18 Consider a game (f1, . . . , fn) where each Xi is a smooth, compact manifold without
boundary. Suppose each agent i ∈ I adopts a stochastic gradient-based learning algorithm that
satisfies Assumptions 2 and 3 and is such that sample points xt ∈ X for all t ≥ 0. Further, suppose
that for each i ∈ I, there exist a constant bi > 0 such that E[(wi,t · v)+|Fi,t] ≥ bi for every
unit vector v ∈ Rmi . Then competitive stochastic gradient-based learning converges to linearly
unstable cycles on a set of measure zero—i.e. P (L(xt) = ξ) = 0 where {xt} is a sample path.
As we noted, periodic orbits are not necessarily excluded from the limiting behavior of gradient-
based learning in games. We leave out the proof of Theorem 18 since after some algebraic ma-
nipulation, it is a direct application of (Benaı¨m and Hirsch, 1995, Theorem 2.1) which is stated
below.
Theorem 19 (Theorem 2.1 Benaı¨m and Hirsch (1995)) Let ξ ⊂ X be a hyperbolic linearly un-
stable cycle of h. Assume the following (i) h ∈ C2; (ii) c1/tη ≤ γt ≤ c2/tη with 0 < c1 ≤ c2 and
0 < η ≤ 1; and (iii) there exists b ≥ 0 such that for all unit vectors v ∈ Rm, E[(wt · v)+|Ft] ≥ b.
Then P (L({xt}) = ξ) = 0.
B.2 Morse-Smale Games
For a class of games admitting gradient-like vector fields we can go beyond non-convergence results
and give convergence guarantees. Following Benaı¨m and Hirsch (1995), we introduce a new class
of games, which we call Morse-Smale games, that are a generalization of potential games. Such
games represent an important class since the vector field of ω corresponds to Morse-Smale vector
field which is known to be generic in R2 and are otherwise structurally stable Hirsch (1976); Palis
and Smale (1970).
Definition 20 A game (f1, . . . , fn) with fi ∈ Cr for some r ≥ 3 and where strategy spaces Xi is
a smooth, compact manifold without boundary for each i ∈ I is a Morse-Smale game if the vector
4. The torus T = S1 × S1 is an example. The interested reader can consult, e.g., Lee (2012) for more details on
differential geometry.
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field corresponding to the differential ω is Morse-Smale—that is, the following hold: (i) all periodic
orbits ξ (i.e. equilibria and cycles) are hyperbolic andW s(ξ) tW u(ξ) (i.e. the stable and unstable
manifolds of ξ intersect transversally), (ii) every forward and backward omega limit set is a periodic
orbit, (iii) and ω has a global attractor.
The conditions of Morse-Smale in the above definition ensure that there are only finitely many
periodic orbits. The dynamics of games with more general vector fields, on the other hand, can
admit chaos (e.g. the classic Lorentz attractor can be cast as gradient-play in a 3-player game).
Hyperbolic equilibria and periodic orbits are the only types of limiting behavior that have been
shown to correspond to strategies relevant to the underlying game Benaim and Hirsch (1997). The
simplest example of a Morse-Smale vector field is a gradient flow. However, not all Morse-Smale
vector fields are gradient flows and hence, not all Morse-Smale games are potential games.
Example 1 Consider the n-player game with Xi = R for each i ∈ I and fn(x) = xn(x21 −
1), fi(x) = xixi+1, ∀i ∈ I/{n} This is a Morse-Smale game that is not a potential game. Indeed,
x˙ = −ω(x) where ω = [x2, x3, . . . , xn−1, x21−1] is a dynamical system with a Morse-Smale vector
field that is not a gradient vector field Conley (1978).
Essentially, in a neighborhood of a critical point for a Morse-Smale game, the game behavior
can be described by a Morse function φ such that near critical points ω can be written as Dφ and
away from critical points ω points in the same direction as Dφ—i.e. ω ·Dφ > 0. Specializing the
class of Morse-Smale games, we have stronger convergence guarantees.
Theorem 21 Consider a Morse-Smale game (f1, . . . , fn) on smooth boundaryless compact mani-
fold X . Suppose Assumptions 2 and 3 hold and that {xt} is defined on X . Let {ξi, i = 1, . . . , l}
denote the set of periodic orbits inX . Then
∑l
i=1 P (L({xt}) = ξi) = 1 and P (L({xt}) = ξi) > 0
implies ξi is linearly stable. Moreover, if the periodic orbit ξi with P (L({xt}) = ξi) > 0 is an
equilibrium, then it is either a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium—which is generically
a local Nash—or a non-Nash locally asymptotically stable equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 21 follows by invoking Corollary 22 which is stated below.
Corollary 22 (Corollary 2.2 Benaı¨m and Hirsch (1995)) Assume that there exists δ ≥ 1 such that∑
n≥0 γ
1+δ
n < ∞ and that h is a Morse-Smale vector field. If we denote by {ξi, i = 1, . . . , l} the
set of periodic orbits in X , then
∑l
i=1 P (L({xt}) = ξi) = 1. Further, if conditions (i)–(iii) of
Theorem 19 hold, then P (L({xt}) = ξi) > 0 implies ξi is linearly stable.
Thus, in Morse-Smale games, with probability one, the limit sets of competitive gradient-based
learning with stochastic updates are attractors (i.e., periodic orbits, which includes limit cyles and
equilibria) of x˙ = −ω(x) and if any attractor has positive probability of being a limit set of the
players’ collective update rule, then it is (linearly) stable. Moreover, attractors that are equilibria are
either non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria (generically local Nash equilbiria) or non-Nash
locally asymptotically stable equilibria, but not saddle points.
If we further restrict the class of games to potential games, the results for Morse-Smale games
imply convergence to Nash almost surely, a particularly strong convergence guarantee.
Corollary 23 Consider the game (f1, . . . , fn) on smooth boundaryless compact manifold X =
X1 × · · · × Xn admitting potential function φ. Suppose each agent i ∈ I adopts a stochastic
25
MAZUMDAR, RATLIFF, AND SASTRY
gradient-based learning algorithm that satisfies Assumptions 2 and 3 and such that {xt} evolves on
X . Further, suppose that for each i ∈ I, there exist a constant bi > 0 such that E[(wi,t ·v)+|Fi,t] ≥
bi for every unit vector v ∈ Rmi . Then, competitive stochastic gradient-based learning converges
to a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium almost surely.
The proof of Corollary 23 follows from the fact that potential games are trivially Morse-Smale
games that admit no periodic cycles as we showed in the proof of Corollary 13.
Proof [Proof of Corollary 23] Consider a potential game (f1, . . . , fn) where each Xi is a smooth,
compact boundaryless manifold. Then ω = Dφ for some φ ∈ Cr which implies that ω is a
gradient flow and hence, does not admit limit cycles. Let {ξi, i = 1, . . . , l} be the set of equi-
librium points in X . Under the assumptions of Theorem 21,
∑l
i=1 P (L({xt}) = ξi) = 1 and, if
P (L({xt}) = ξi) > 0, then ξi is a linearly stable equilibrium point which is a non-degenerate dif-
ferential Nash equilibrium of the game due to the fact that Dω(x) is symmetric in potential games.
Hence, a sample path {xt} converges to a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium with prob-
ability one. Moreover, by Ratliff et al. (2014), we know it is generically a local Nash.
We note, that even though a potential function is enough to guarantee convergence to a local
Nash equilibrium, potential games can still admit local Nash equilibria that are strict saddle points
as shown in Section 3. Thus, even this relatively well-behaved class of games has fundamental
problems when applying a gradient-based learning scheme.
Appendix C. Classes of Gradient-Based Learning Algorithms
In this section, we provide derivation of the gradient-based learning rules provided in Table 1. We
note that the derivation of gradient-based approaches for multi-armed bandits can be found in Sutton
and Barto (2017) among other classic references on reinforcement learning.
C.1 Online Optimization: Gradient Play in Non-Cooperative Games
We first show that classical online optimization algorithms fit into the framework we describe. In
this case, each agent is directly trying to minimize their own function fi(xi, x−i), which can depend
on the current iterate of the other agents. There are many examples in the optimization literature
of this type of setup. We note that in the full information case, the competitive gradient-based
learning framework we describe here is simply gradient play Fudenberg and Levine (1998), a very
well-studied game-theoretic learning rule.
Of more interest are some gradient-free online optimization algorithms that also fit into the
framework we describe. The game can be described as follows. At each iteration, t of the game,
every player publishes their current iterate xi,t. Player i, implementing this algorithm, then updates
their iterate by taking a random unit vector u, and querying fi(xi + δiu, x−i). The update map is
given by xi,t+1 = xi,t − γifi(xi + δiu, x−i)u. It is shown in Flaxman et al. (2005) that fi(xi +
δiu, x−i)u is an unbiased estimate of the gradient of a smoothed version of fi—i.e. fˆi(xi, x−i) =
Ev[fi(x + δv, x−i)]. Thus the loss function being minimized by the agent is fˆi. In this case, the
results on characterizing limiting behavior presented in Section 4.2 apply.
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C.2 Generative Adversarial Networks
Generative adversarial networks take a game theoretic approach to fitting a generative model in
complex structured spaces. Specifically, they approach the problem of fitting a generative model
from a data set of samples from some distribution Q ∈ ∆(Y ) as a zero-sum game between a
generator and a discriminator. In general, both the generator and the discriminator are modeled as
deep neural networks. The generator network outputs a sample Gθ(z) ∈ Y in the same space Y as
the sampled data set given a random noise signal z ∼ F as an input. The discriminator Dw(y) tries
to discriminate between a true sample and a sample generated by the generator—that is, it takes
as input a sample y drawn from Q or the generator and tries to determine if its real or fake. The
goal, is to find a Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game under which the generator will learn to
generate samples that are indistinguishable from the true samples—i.e. in equilibrium, the generator
has learned the underlying distribution.
To prevent instabilities in the training of GANs with zero-one discriminators, the Wasserstein
GAN attempts to approximate the Wasserstein-1 metric between the true distribution and the distri-
bution of the generator. In this setting, Dw(·) is a 1-Lipschitz function leading to the problem
infθ supw Ey∼Q[Dw(y)]− Ez∼F [Dw(Gθ(z))]
which has corresponding dynamics wt+1 = wt + γ∇wL(θt, wt) and θt+1 = θt − γ∇θL(θt, wt)
where L(θ, w) = Ey∼Q[Dw(y)]− Ez∼F [Dw(Gθ(z))] and where γ is the learning rate.
GANs are notoriously difficult to train. The typical approach is to allow each player to per-
form (stochastic) gradient descent on the derivative of their cost with respect to their own choice
variable. There are two important observations about gradient-based learning approaches to GANs
relevant to this paper. First, the equilibrium that is sought is generally a saddle point and second, the
dynamics of GANs are complex enough to admit limit cycles Mertikopoulos et al. (2018). None-
the-less, training GANs with gradient descent is still very common. We note that our results suggest
that, on top of periodic orbits and oscillations, training GANs with gradient descent can result in
convergence to non-Nash equilibria.
C.3 Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Algorithms
Consider a setting in which all agents are operating in an MDP. There is a shared state space S. Each
agent, indexed by I = {1, . . . , n} has their own action space Ui and reward function Ri : S ×U →
∆R where U = U1 × · · · × Un. We note the reward functions could themselves be random, but
for illustrative purposes we suppose they are deterministic. Finally, the dynamics of the MDP are
described by a state transition kernel P : S × U → ∆S and an initial state distribution P0. Each
agent i also has a policy, pii, that returns a distribution over Ui for each state s ∈ S. We define a
trajectory of the MDP, τ as τ = {(st, ui,t, u−i,u)}T−1t=0 . Thus, a trajectory is a finite sequence of
states, the actions of each player in that state, and the reward agent i received in that state, where T
is the time horizon. Given fixed policies we can define a distribution over the space of all trajectories
Γ, namely PΓ(pi), by
PΓ(τ ;pi) = P0(s0)
∏
i∈I pii(ui,0|s0) · · ·P (st|st−1, ut−1)
∏
i∈I pii(ui,t|st) · · ·
The goal of each single agent in this setup is to maximize their cumulative expected reward over a
time horizon T . That is, the agent is trying to find a policy pii so as to maximize some function,
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which in keeping with our general formulation in Section 2, we write as −fi since this problem is
a maximization. When an agent is employing policy gradient in this MARL setup, we assume that
their policy comes from a parametric class of policies parametrized by xi ∈ Xi ⊂ Rmi . To simplify
notation, we write the parametric policy as pii(xi) where for each xi, given an state s, pii(xi) is a
probability distribution on actions ui which we denote by pii(xi)(·|s).
The policy gradient MARL algorithm can be reformulated in the competitive gradient-based
learning framework. An agent i using policy gradient is trying to tune the parameters xi of their
policy to maximize their expected reward over a trajectory of length T . We define the reward of
agent i over a trajectory of the MDP, τ ∈ Γ, to be Ri(τ) =
∑T−1
t=0 Ri(st,i,t , u−i,t). Thus, each
agent’s loss function fi, in keeping with our notation, is given by fi(xi, x−i) = −Ji(pii(xi), pi−i) =
−Eτ∼PΓ(pi)[Ri(τ))]. The actions of agent i in the continuous game framework described in previous
sections are the parameters of their policy, and thus their action space is Xi ⊂ Rmi . We note
that we have made no assumptions on the other player’s actions x−i. That is, they do not need
to be employing the same parameterized policy class or exactly the same gradient-based update
procedure; the only requirement is that they also be using a gradient based multi-agent learning
algorithm, and that their actions give rise to a set of policies pi−i that govern the way they choose
their actions in the MDP.
In the full information case, at each round, t of the game, a player plays according to pii(xi,t) for
a time horizon T , and then performs a gradient update on their parameters where Difi(xi, x−i) =
DiJi(pii(xi), pi−i,t) is given by
DiJi(pii(xi), pi−i) = Eτ∼PΓ(pi)
[∑T−1
t=0 Ri(st, ut)
∑t
j=0∇xi log pii(xi)(ui,j |sj)
]
(8)
The derivation of this gradient is exactly the same as that of classic policy gradient. From (8) it is
clear that an unbiased estimate of the gradient can be constructed. At each time t in the policy gradi-
ent update procedure, agent i receives a T horizon roll-out, say zi,t = {(sk, ui,k, ri,k)}T−1k=0 , and con-
structs the unbiased estimate of the gradient—i.e. D̂iJi =
∑T−1
k=0 ri,k
(∑k
j=0∇xi log pii(xi,t)(ui,j |sj)
)
.
We note that in this case, the agent does not need to know the policies of the other agents, or anything
about the dynamics of the MDP. The agent can construct the estimator solely from the sequence of
states, the reward they received in those states, and their own actions. With these two derivations of
the gradient for the full information and gradient-free cases, policy gradient for MARL conforms to
the competitive gradient-based learning framework and hence, the results of Section 4 apply under
appropriate assumptions.
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